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Recent lab experiments by Traulsen et al. [1] for the spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma suggest that exploratory behavior of human subjects
prevents cooperation through neighborhood interactions over exper-
imentally accessible time spans. This indicates that new theoretical
and experimental efforts are needed to explore the mechanisms un-
derlying a number of famous puzzles in the social sciences.
spatial games | evolution of cooperation | pattern formation
Cooperation is the essence that keeps societies together. Itis the basis of solidarity and social order. When humans
stop cooperating, this can imply a war of everybody against
everybody. Understanding why and under what conditions
humans cooperate is, therefore, one of the grand challenges
of science [2], particularly in social dilemma situations (where
collective cooperation would be beneficial, but individual free-
riding is the most profitable strategy).
When humans have social dilemma kind of interactions
with randomly changing partners, a “tragedy of the com-
mons” [3], i.e. massive free-riding is expected to occur. But
how are humans then able to create public goods (such as a
shared culture or a public infrastructure) and build up func-
tioning social benefit systems despite of their self-interest?
Under what conditions will they be able to fight global warm-
ing collectively? To answer related research questions, scien-
tists have experimentally studied, among other factors, the
influence of spatial and network interactions on the level of
cooperation in various games (including non-dilemmatic ones)
[4–6].
In their laboratory experiments, Traulsen et al. [1] have
now implemented Nowak’s and May’s prisoner’s dilemma
in two-dimensional space [7], where the size of the two-
dimensional spatial grid, the number of interaction partners
and the payoff parameters were modified for experimental rea-
sons. The prisoner’s dilemma describes interactions between
pairs of individuals, where free-riding is tempting, and cooper-
ation is risky. Therefore, if individuals interact with different
people each time (as in the case of well-mixed interactions),
everybody is predicted to end up free-riding. If the world was
really like this, social systems would not work.
However, in computer simulations of the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma [7], cooperative (“altruistic”) behavior is able to sur-
vive through spatial clustering of similar strategies. This
finding, which can dramatically change the outcome of the
system, is also called “network reciprocity” [8]. When in-
dividuals have neighborhood interactions and imitate better
performing neighbors unconditionally, this can create correla-
tions between the behaviors of neighboring individuals. Such
spatio-temporal pattern formation facilitates a co-evolution of
the behaviors and the spatial organization of individuals, gen-
erating configurations that can promote cooperative behavior.
In fact, some long-standing puzzles in the social sciences find
a natural solution, when spatial interactions are taken into
account. This includes the higher-than-expected level of co-
operation in social dilemma situations and the spreading of
costly punishment [9]. The question is, whether these theo-
retical findings are also supported by experimental data?
The recent results by Traulsen et al. [1] do not indicate a
significant effect of spatial neighborhood interactions on the
level of cooperation. This is, because their experimental sub-
jects did not show an unconditional imitation of neighbors
with a higher payoff, as it is assumed in many game-theoretical
models. In fact, it is known that certain game-theoretical re-
sults are sensitive to details of the model such as the number of
interaction partners, the inclusion of self-interactions or not,
or significant levels of randomness [10] (see Fig. 1). More-
over, people have proposed a considerable number of different
strategy update rules, which matter as well. Besides uncon-
ditional imitation, these include the best response rule [11],
multi-stage strategies such as tit for tat [12], win-stay-lose-
shift rules [13] and aspiration-dependent rules [14], further-
more probabilistic rules such as the proportional imitation
rule [15], the Fermi rule [16], and the unconditional imita-
tion rule with a superimposed randomness (“noise”). In ad-
dition, there are voter [17] and opinion dynamics models [18]
of various kinds, which assume social influence. According to
these, individuals would imitate behavioral strategies, which
are more frequent in their neighborhood. So, how do individ-
uals really update their behavioral strategies?
Traulsen et al. find that the probability to cooperate in-
creases with the number of cooperative neighbors as expected
from the Asch experiment [19]. Moreover, the probability
of strategy changes increases with the payoff difference in a
way that can be approximated by the Fermi rule [16]. In the
case of two behavioral strategies only, it corresponds to the
well-known multi-nomial logit model of decision theory [20].
However, there is a discontinuity in the data as the payoff dif-
ference turns from positive to negative values, which may be
an effect of risk aversion [21]. To describe the time-dependent
level of cooperation, it is sufficient to assume unconditional
imitation with a certain probability and strategy mutations
otherwise, where the mutation rate is surprisingly large in the
beginning and exponentially decaying over time.
Understanding the origin of this “noise” would be impor-
tant to control it experimentally and to reveal effects that
would otherwise be hidden in the randomness of the data. Do
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people make mistakes or do they choose to behave in a noisy
way? As Fig. 2 of Ref. [1] shows, rather than quickly destroy-
ing cooperation, randomness leads to more cooperation in the
experiment of Traulsen et al. than the unconditional imitation
rule predicts. This goes along with a significantly higher aver-
age payoff than for the unconditional imitation rule (see Fig.
1). In other words, the random component of the strategy up-
date is profitable for the experimental subjects. This suggests
that randomness in social systems may play a functional role.
Given that Traulsen et al. do not find effects of spatial in-
teractions, do we have to say good bye to network reciprocity
in social systems, despite the nice explanations it is offering?
Probably not. The empirically confirmed spreading of obesity,
smoking, happiness, and cooperation in social networks [22]
indicates that effects of imitating neighbors (also friends or
colleagues) are relevant, but probably over longer time peri-
ods than 25 interactions. In fact, according to formula [3] of
Traulsen et al., cooperation could spread after about 40 iter-
ations, when the mutation rate has decreased to low enough
values. Such an effect should occur, when self-interactions are
taken into account (see Fig. 1). To make it observable exper-
imentally, however, one would have to reduce the necessary
number of iterations by varying the experimental conditions.
The particular value of the work by Traulsen et al. is
that it facilitates more realistic computer simulations and,
thereby, also allows one to determine payoff values and other
model parameters, which are expected to produce interest-
ing effects after an experimentally accessible number of itera-
tions. Due to non-linear feedback effects, experimental games
can have qualitatively different outcomes, which are hard to
predict without extensive computer simulations scanning the
parameter space. Such parameter dependencies could, in fact,
explain some of the apparent inconsistencies between empir-
ical observations in different areas of the world [23] (at least
when framing effects such as the expected level of reciprocity
and their impact on the effective payoffs [8] are taken into
account). The progress in the social sciences by understand-
ing the parameter-dependence of system behaviors would be
enormous. While the effort to determine them experimen-
tally is prohibitive, one could still check computationally pre-
dicted, parameter-dependent outcomes by targeted experi-
ments. Hence, the future of social experimenting lies in the
combination of computational and experimental approaches,
where computer simulations optimize the experimental set-
ting and experiments are used to verify, falsify or improve the
underlying model assumptions.
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Fig. 1. Average payoff of all individuals in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma with and
without self-interactions, displayed over the number of iterations. It is clearly visible
that the initial payoff drops quickly. In the noiseless case, the average payoff does
not change anymore after a few iterations (see broken lines). This is, because the
spatial configuration freezes. In contrast, in the case of decaying noise, the average
payoff keeps changing (see solid lines). It is interesting that the average payoff, when
no self-interactions are taken into account, is higher in the noisy case than in the
noiseless one over the time period of the laboratory experiment by Traulsen et al.,
covering 25 iterations (see blue lines). The better performance in the presence of
strategy mutations could be a possible reason for the high level of strategy mutations
observed by them. If self-interactions are considered (see orange lines), the average
payoff recovers after about 40 iterations, which correlates with an increase in the level
of cooperation (see Movie S1). To see this effect, experiments should be run over
over at least 60 iterations, or the payoff parameters should be changed in such a way
that the average payoff recovers earlier. It is conceivable, however, that experimental
subjects would show a lower level of strategy mutations under conditions where noise
does not pay off (in contrast to the experimental setting without self-interactions).
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